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ABSTRACT
Blockchains are intended to be immutable, so an attacker who is
able to delete transactions through a chain reorganization (a ma-
licious reorg) can perform a profitable double-spend attack. We
study the rate at which an attacker can execute reorgs in the Tezos
Proof-of-Stake protocol. As an example, an attacker with 40% of the
staking power is able to execute a 20-block malicious reorg at an
average rate of once per day, and the attack probability increases
super-linearly as the staking power grows beyond 40%. Moreover,
an attacker of the Tezos protocol knows in advance when an at-
tack opportunity will arise, and can use this knowledge to arrange
transactions to double-spend. We show that in particular cases, the
Tezos protocol can be adjusted to protect against deep reorgs. For
instance, we demonstrate protocol parameters that reduce the rate
of length-20 reorg opportunities for a 40% attacker by two orders
of magnitude. We also observe a trade-off between optimizing for
robustness to deep reorgs (costly deviations that may be net prof-
itable because they enable double-spends) and robustness to selfish
mining (mining deviations that result in typically short reorgs that
are profitable even without double-spends). That is, the parame-
ters that optimally protect against one make the other attack easy.
Finally, we develop a method that monitors the Tezos blockchain
health with respect to malicious reorgs using only publicly available
information.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Applied computing → Electronic commerce; Digital cash;
E-commerce infrastructure; Secure online transactions;Elec-
tronic funds transfer.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchains are designed to be immutable in order to protect against
attackers who seek to delete transactions through chain reorga-
nizations (malicious reorgs). Any attacker who causes a reorg of
the chain could double-spend transactions, meaning they commit
a transaction to the chain, receive some goods in exchange, and
then delete the transaction, effectively robbing their counterparty.
Nakamoto [15] demonstrated that, in a Proof-of-Work (PoW) setting,
minority (<50%) attacker forks have an exponentially decreasing
probability of overtaking the honest chain (thus causing a reorg) as
more honest blocks are built. This ensures that transactions written
to blocks will remain on the chain with high probability. Because
PoW protocols require significant energy expenditure and provide
low transaction throughput, Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols are seen
as a viable alternative and are being used by a number of projects
(capitalizations as of September 2020): Tezos [10] ($1.8 billion), Car-
dano [11] ($2.5 billion), EOS [8] ($2.6 billion), Nxt [7] ($11 million),
and BlackCoin [22] ($2.5 million).
A common feature of PoS protocols not present in PoW is global
predictability. That is, participants in the consensus protocol (stak-
ers) are able to determine far in advance exactly when they will have
the opportunity to mine blocks (in the case of Tezos, days ahead of
time). This helps validators know when to create or validate a block,
but this predictability also makes a double-spend attack easier to
perform, as an attacker knows precisely when the opportunity to
reorg will arise, allowing them to send a soon-to-be-deleted trans-
action to an unsuspecting counterparty at exactly the right time.
This precision is not possible to achieve under PoW protocols, as
no miner knows in advance when they will successfully mine a
block.
In this work, we analyze the Tezos PoS protocol and develop a
method to calculate the rate of malicious reorgs. We show, for
example, that an attacker with 40% of the total stake is able to
execute a 20-blockmalicious reorg at an average rate of once per day,
and that an attacker’s power grows quickly as its staking percentage
increases beyond that point. We also study the extent to which
adjusting the design parameters of the protocol can protect against
such attacks. We find a set of protocol parameters for Tezos PoS
that decrease the rate of attack opportunities by over 50% compared
to the current design choice for specific values of the attacker’s
stake. As an example, the 40% attacker under the suggested protocol
parameters only achieves a length-20 reorg once per year.
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We also demonstrate a trade-off in setting these design parame-
ters between optimizing the PoS protocol for safety against deep
reorgs versus safety against selfish mining. Selfish mining is defined
as a mining strategy in which the attacker earns more protocol-
prescribed rewards than behaving honestly by selectively withhold-
ing blocks instead of publishing them immediately. When feasi-
ble, selfish mining incentivizes dishonest behavior even without a
double-spend (and double-spends are implausible in the typically
shallow reorgs of a selfish-mine). Selfish mining has been exten-
sively studied in PoW [9, 12, 16, 20]. We find that the parameters
that optimally protect against deep reorgs also make selfish mining
easier, confirming the findings of Nomadic Labs [13]. Fundamen-
tally, this is because opportunities for selfish mining occur more
frequently in shorter reorgs (typically less than 5 blocks), while
double-spend attacks require deeper reorgs (we consider reorgs up
to length 80). In a selfish mining attack, the length of the attack is
determined by the protocol rewards, and attacker continues as long
as they earn more rewards than following the honest strategy. The
length of a reorg needed to successfully execute a double-spend
transaction depends on how many block confirmations a counter-
party requires before releasing a good to the attacker. This varies
depending on the blockchain, but is generally recommended to be
30 blocks for Tezos [2].
We also develop a method that monitors the health of the Tezos
blockchain with regard to reorg attacks, using only on-chain, pub-
licly available information. This metric allows users to identify
potentially vulnerable chain states and take extra care with accept-
ing large transactions.
Outline. Section 2 presents the Tezos PoS model and describes
our technique for computing the probability of a malicious reorg.
Section 3 presents the results of our analysis, showing frequency
of attack opportunity as a function of attacker strength and attack
depth. For the purpose of this analysis, we estimate the probabili-
ties of a malicious reorg using analytical methods when possible,
but primarily with Monte Carlo and importance sampling (see Ap-
pendices C & D for more details). In Section 4, we consider the
relationship between parameters in the Tezos PoS protocol and
the susceptibility of the protocol to reorgs and selfish mining. In
Section 5 we provide a method to monitor the likelihood of impend-
ing attacks based only on public information, and we demonstrate
through simulation the effectiveness of this method.
1.1 Related Work
Deep reorgs are dangerous for any blockchain, and a number of
studies have considered vulnerability to these kinds of attacks.
Nakamoto [15] provided a simple analysis of the expected frequency
with which a minority attacker could execute deep reorgs on Bit-
coin and Rosenfeld [19] followed up in more detail, calculating
the probability of different length reorgs given various attacker
strengths.
This question has also been investigated in PoS protocols. Ki-
ayias et al. [11] formally analyze Ouroboros, which underpins the
Cardano blockchain, by studying the rate at which deep reorgs
occur through a probabilistic analysis of states in which forks arise.
They present security proofs as well as experimental results from
their analysis, which demonstrate that long block confirmation wait
times are required to avoid a double-spend from an adversary who
has a large percentage of the stake. In another PoS analysis, Popov
[18] presents a probabilistic approach to reorg susceptibility in the
Nxt protocol, and concludes that security in the model relies on the
attacker having less than one-third of the the total staking power.
Buterin et al. [5] present a model of the Ethereum 2.0 beacon chain,
a forthcoming PoS protocol. Their design combines the GHOST
(“greedy heaviest-observed subtree”) fork choice rule [21] with the
Casper consensus protocol [4]. They prove liveness of the protocol
both probabilistically and practically in the face of an adversary
with less than one-third of the staking power (a constraint that is
not imposed on the Tezos protocol), and minimize deep reorgs by
enforcing finality through checkpoints. Nomadic Labs, the research
group that implemented the 2020 software update to Tezos, called
Carthage, published a blog post analyzing the rate of forking in the
Tezos consensus mechanism [13]. The blog post links to the code
used to conduct their analyses and provides a high level intuition
for the techniques used. Complementing this, we present an explicit
formulation of the techniques and models used in our analysis and
confirm that these two analyses match where they consider the
same questions.
The present paper builds on Neuder et al. [17], who study selfish
mining in Tezos and show that it is sometimes more profitable to
create a length-2 reorg than to follow the honest protocol. This pre-
vious work considered only selfish mining and not the possibility of
reorgs conducted for the purpose of double-spends. In the present
paper, we focus instead on the rate at which malicious reorgs are
feasible, without concern for protocol-reward based profit. Coupled
with double-spends, deep reorgs have the potential to generate a
profit for an attacker that far exceeds protocol rewards. We also de-
velop a model of profitability for selfish mining of arbitrary length,
instead of restricting analysis to length-2 forks, by making use of
Monte Carlo methods alongside importance sampling for sample
efficiency.
This work also relates to the literature on selfish mining. First
discussed in PoW chains by Eyal and Sirer [9], Brown-Cohen et al.
[3] study selfish mining for PoS, demonstrating that all longest-
chain PoS systems are susceptible to predictable selfish mining and
predictable double-spend attacks, by which they mean situations
where attackers can determine ahead of time when either attack
will be possible. These attacks, hypothesized for abstract models of
longest-chain PoS systems by Brown-Cohen et al. [3], are modelled
for the Tezos protocol in this work.
2 THE TEZOS PROOF-OF-STAKE PROTOCOL
The Tezos blockchain launched in 2018 and had a market capital-
ization of $1.8 billion as of September 2020, ranking 15th by this
metric among cryptocurrencies. Tezos uses a longest-chain1 PoS
protocol, and includes a number of distinguishing features such as
on-chain governance and Turing-complete smart contract support
[6]. The model that we study relies on a synchronous network in
which all honest operations are seen by all participants before the
1Longest-chain refers to the fork choice rule that the honest nodes follow. When
presented with conflicting forks, the honest nodes choose whichever has more blocks,
as in the Bitcoin PoW implementation.
Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake AFT ’20, October 21–23, 2020, New York, NY, USA
Figure 1: The progress of an honest (green blocks) and attacker (red blocks) chain for a length-nmalicious reorg. The gold block
on the left represents the last publicly agreed upon block, and the origin of the attacker’s private fork. For each block we give
the particular priority and number of endorsements with which it is baked. The state variables a = (aℓ+1,aℓ+2, ...,aℓ+n ), h =
(hℓ+1,hℓ+2, ...,hℓ+n ), and e = (eℓ , eℓ+1, ..., eℓ+n−1) denote the sequence of attacker priorities, honest network priorities, and at-
tacker endorsements, respectively. A length-nmalicious reorg is feasible if the attacker can reach the ℓ+n block height before
the honest network.
subsequent block is published. This is a common assumption in the
selfish mining literature [9, 13, 17, 20].
2.1 The Protocol
Participants in the Tezos PoS protocol put a certain amount of
Tezos tokens into escrow smart contracts (staking) as collateral to
incentivize their own honest behavior. In each block, a sample of
these stakers is randomly selected to participate by filling one of
two roles: baker or endorser.
◦ Bakers collect transactions gossiped over the P2P network
and assemble them into blocks to publish (analogous tominer
in Proof-of-Work protocols)
◦ Endorsers cryptographically sign the best block (specified
below) they have heard about at a given height.
The protocol issues rewards to those selected. At each block
height, 32 stakers are chosen as endorsers. In order to ensure that
a block is baked at each block height, a list of potential bakers is
drawn, and the index of a staker in that list indicates the priority
with which they can create a block.
In order to allocate block creation and endorsement rights, Tezos
implements a ‘follow-the-Satoshi’ random token selection process.
The currency is divided into rolls of 8,000 native tokens (XTZ). At
each block height, rolls are drawn at random to determine who
has the ability to create and endorse a block. This is all the detail
we need for our present model and analysis. For a more detailed
description of the Tezos consensus layer, see [1, 17].
A block’s validity depends not only on the validity of the trans-
actions it contains but also its timestamp. A block is valid when a
specified delay has elapsed between it and its predecessor. This de-
lay is a function of the priority of the baker, p, (0 is highest priority,
followed by 1, etc.) and the number of endorsements that the block
includes, e .
Definition 2.1 (Validity). In order for a block to be valid, its times-
tamp must be at least D(p, e) seconds greater than that of the
previous block, where
D(p, e) = 60 + 40 · p + 8 · max(24 − e, 0). (1)
Both endorsers and bakers are rewarded for participation in the
consensus layer.
Definition 2.2 (Reward). The baker’s reward, Rb (p, e), for a block
with e endorsements and priority p, is
Rb (p, e) =
{
1.25e if p = 0
0.1875e otherwise.
(2)
The endorser’s reward, Re (pi ), given the endorsement is in-
cluded in a block baked by a baker with priority pi , is
Re (pi ) =
{
1.25 if pi = 0
0.8333333 otherwise.
(3)
Observe that the reward for baking a block without the highest
priority is substantially smaller than a block with priority 0.
We define a length-n malicious reorg as the situation in which an
attacker can create n blocks faster than the rest of the network, with
the effect that n − 1 blocks are deleted from the public, or canonical,
chain. This offers an opportunity for an n − 1 confirmation double-
spend, in which the attacker makes a transaction that is included
on the public chain and then waits n − 1 blocks before deleting the
block that includes the transaction.
2.2 Malicious Reorgs
It is helpful to define the state of the Tezos PoS protocol as it relates
to the honest (public) chain and an attacker’s chain.
Definition 2.3 (Slot Configuration). We use the following three
variables to describe the configuration of a slot at block height ℓ:
◦ aℓ , the highest priority of the attacker for slot ℓ.
◦ hℓ , the highest priority of the honest network for slot ℓ.
◦ eℓ , the number of endorsement rights owned by the attacker
at slot ℓ.
We can define the state of the Tezos PoS protocol by composing
n slots together.
Definition 2.4 (State). The state is made up of three sequences of
length n.
◦ a = (aℓ+1,aℓ+2, ...,aℓ+n ), the next n attacker priorities
◦ h = (hℓ+1,hℓ+2, ...,hℓ+n ), the next n honest priorities
◦ e = (eℓ , eℓ+1, ..., eℓ+n−1), the nextn attacker-owned endorse-
ment counts
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Given this, let S = {a, h, e} denote the state of the next n blocks
of the chain after slot ℓ. See Figure 1.
Notice that (1) is a function of the number of endorsements
for the previous slot that the current block includes, so that the
endorsements start at slot ℓ while the priorities start at slot ℓ + 1.
Additionally, for any given slot i , ai and hi are not independent.
This is because each priority must either be owned by the attacker
or the honest network, but cannot be owned by both.
2.3 Feasibility Function
We now develop an expression to determine if a given stateS allows
a feasible attack. Let δa (a, e) denote the amount of time it takes an
attacker to create n blocks. Based on the delay function (1), we can
calculate δa as
δa (a, e) = D(aℓ+1, 32) +
n∑
i=2
D(aℓ+i , eℓ+i−1). (4)
For the first block, the attacker is able to use all of the honest
endorsements for the previous block. In contrast, since the attacker
is selfishly endorsing their own private fork and not sharing those
endorsements over the P2P network, the honest network will only
hear the 32 − eℓ endorsements that they were allocated at slot ℓ.
The expression for δh (h, e), the time that it takes the rest of the
network to create n blocks, is,
δh (h, e) =
n∑
i=1
D(hℓ+i , 32 − eℓ+i−1). (5)
We do not need a state variable to keep track of the honest
endorsement allocation because we know that at each slot ℓ the
honest network is allocated 32 − eℓ endorsements.
Definition 2.5 (Feasibility of a length-n malicious reorg). The fea-
sibility function for a length-n malicious reorg is
Fn (S) = I[δa (a, e) ≤ δh (h, e)], (6)
where I[condition] = 1 if and only if condition is true.
This function indicates if a reorg is feasible in state S.
2.4 Distribution on States in Tezos PoS
In order to calculate the probability of an attack being feasible, we
first determine the probability of an arbitrary state arising on the
chain.
Let α denote the fraction of the total stake owned by the attacker.
The attacker’s highest priority state variables, ai , are distributed
A ∼ Geometric(α), where we define a geometric random vari-
able as counting the number of failures until a success.2 The hon-
est network’s highest priority state variables, hi , are distributed
H ∼ Geometric(1 − α). This is defined for the complement of α ,
reflecting the amount of stake owned by the honest network. The
endorsement counts, ei , are distributed E ∼ Binomial(32,α), reflect-
ing the number of endorsement rights owned by the attacker when
the probability of owning any one endorsement right is α .
We consider the problem of calculating the probability of a
given state, S = {a, h, e}. By independence, the probability of
2For example, if the highest priority an attacker owns for a particular block is 3, the
probability of this occurring is, Pr[A = 3] = (1 − α )3α , because the priorities of
{0, 1, 2} must all be owned by the honest network.
S is Pr[S] = ∏ni=1 Pr[Si ], where Si = {ai ,hi , ei−1} denotes the
state variables for slot i . The last step is finding an expression for
the value of Pr[Si ]. Here, the events ai and hi are not indepen-
dent because the attacker has the highest priority if and only if
the honest network does not have priority of 0 for a slot. That is,
H = 0 ⇐⇒ A , 0. For each slot, either hi or ai must be equal to
zero, and the other must be non-zero. Using this, the probability of
{ai ,hi } is,
Pr[A = ai ,H = hi ] =
{
αhi (1 − α) if ai = 0
(1 − α)aiα if hi = 0
. (7)
Since the number of endorsement slots owned by the attacker
is independent of the priority list, the probability of Si is Pr[Si ] =
Pr[A = ai ,H = hi ] · Pr[E = ei ], and we have
Pr[S] =
n∏
i=1
Pr[A = ai ,H = hi ] · Pr[E = ei−1]. (8)
We use (8) to validate the results of Monte Carlo estimation as
well as to calculate likelihood ratios for use in importance sampling,
as in 2.6 and Appendix B.
2.5 Calculating Cost
Another factor of interest in the analysis of Tezos is the cost of
an attack. Because the attacker is playing a dishonest policy, the
rewards earned over the next n blocks will differ from what they
would have been had the attacker played honestly.
Given a feasible state S, we provide an expression to calculate
the cost of executing a length-n reorg. Let ϕh (S) be the reward for
the attacker playing honestly over the nextn blocks defined by state
S, and ϕa (S) be the reward for the attacker executing the reorg
policy. These values are based only on the block reward, and do not
correspond to the potential profit from performing a double-spend.
Then we define the cost of an attack as C(S) = ϕh (S) − ϕa (S).
There is no guarantee that the cost is positive. Rather, states
in which the attacker earns more by executing the reorg are sus-
ceptible to selfish mining [17]. We calculate ϕa and ϕh in Tezos as
the sum of the block and endorsement rewards earned from the
respective policies over the course of the next n blocks (Equations
2 & 3). The reward of the ith slot of the state, Si , under the honest
policy is,
ϕh,i (Si ) =
{
Rb (0, 32) + ei−1Re (0) if ai = 0
ei−1Re (0) if ai , 0.
(9)
In this case, the attacker will only earn a block reward if they
have priority 0 for that block. Otherwise, they simply earn the
endorsement value for ending up on the highest priority block.
Given this, the total reward for following the honest policy for the
next n blocks is,
ϕh (S) =
n∑
i=1
ϕh, ℓ+i (Sℓ+i ). (10)
The reward for following the attacking policy for the ith slot is,
ϕa,i (Si ) = Rb (ai , ei−1) + ei−1Re (ai ). (11)
When the n − 1 blocks are deleted, each of the n blocks on the
attacker fork are accepted, and thus earn a block reward. In addition,
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Figure 2: The probability of a feasible reorg on Tezos PoS for different attacker stakes and lengths of reorg, linear axis (left)
and log axis (right). The right-hand plot also shows the probability that corresponds to a daily attack and an annual attack, in
blue and green, respectively. The right figure also displays the 99% confidence interval for each estimator as red errorbars. For
probabilities above 10−7 these are Clopper-Pearson intervals, and for lower probabilities we use importance sampling.
the attacker’s endorsement reward is parameterized with the value
of ai . The total reward earned by following the attacking policy for
n blocks given state S is,
ϕa (S) = Rb (aℓ , 32) + eℓ−1Re (aℓ) +
n∑
i=2
ϕa, ℓ+i (Sℓ+i ). (12)
As with the feasibility function, the index starts at 2 because the
initial block of the attacker fork will include all 32 endorsements.
Combining, the cost for an attack parameterized by the state S is
C(S) = ϕh (S) − ϕa (S). This provides the cost of an attack given
that it is feasible to execute a length-n malicious reorg. We use this
expression to calculate the cost of deep reorgs, as well as identify
states that are susceptible to selfish mining.
2.6 Estimating Attack Probabilities
We use three techniques to estimate the probability of a reorg being
feasible. For small reorgs, we can estimate probabilities directly,
by enumerating a large subset of the high probability states and
counting those which allow feasible reorgs. Because the number of
possible states (permutations) grows exponentially in fork length,
this enumeration technique quickly becomes computationally in-
tractable (see Appendix A and B).
Mainly, we use Monte Carlo estimation, along with importance
sampling for variance reduction. Monte Carlo estimation provides
an unbiased estimator for the probability of a length-n reorg by
randomly generating states according to the attacker’s stake, α ,
and dividing the number of feasible states by the sample size. This
works well in cases where the probability of an attack is relatively
large.
When trying to estimate the probability of a rare event, however,
extremely large sample sizes are necessary in order to obtain a tight
confidence interval. For better sample efficiency, we use importance
sampling, which relies on defining a new distribution in which the
event of interest occurs more frequently, and then weighting the
value in the sum by the likelihood ratio, which is the probability
that the event occurs under the original distribution divided by
the probability that it occurs under the modified distribution. See
Appendix C and Appendix D for details, along with a comparison
with direct calculations (Appendix B) and a demonstration of the
variance reduction obtained through importance sampling (Figure
8, Appendix D).
3 MALICIOUS REORGS IN TEZOS POS
We now present the probabilities with which deep reorgs are fea-
sible in Tezos. As outlined in Section 2.6, we approximate these
probabilities using a standard Monte Carlo method as well as im-
portance sampling for events occurring with probability less than
10−7.
Figure 2 shows the probability of a feasible reorg on Tezos PoS,
along with the confidence intervals of the attack probabilities for
length 20, 35, 55, & 80 reorgs. In Figure 2 (left), we see that the
probability of a feasible attack is relatively low until around α =
0.42, above which the probability of feasible attack increases rapidly.
Figure 2 (right) uses a log y-axis, and the blue and green lines
correspond to the probability level at which we would see an attack
in expectation, once daily and once yearly respectively. Notice that
with an attack stake of about 36%, an attacker can expect to do a
length-20 reorg once a year, and with an attack stake of about 40%,
an attacker can expect to do a length-20 reorg once a day.
Beyond feasibility, deep reorgs are cheap to execute in terms of
amount of block reward lost relative to playing an honest strategy.
By calculating the average cost of a feasible attack through Monte
Carlo simulations, we find that all attacks less than or equal to
length 32 cost under 305 XTZ (≈ $700 as of April 2020), with longer
attacks being similarly cheap.
These costs are small relative to the large potential profit from a
successful double-spend. The primary challenge in implementing a
deep reorg is in obtaining enough stake to create a feasible attack.
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Figure 3: Slices of the design space, optimized here for β = 0.5, which considers an objective that seeks to minimize the average
probability of a length-20 reorg and a length-3 selfish-mine for an attacker with stake α = 0.45. Lower (darker) values are
desirable. For each slice, we fix the third design parameter to that in the Tezos PoS protocol, and the blue boxes correspond to
the Tezos design ξ = (24, 8, 40).
4 PROTOCOL MODIFICATIONS
In this section, we consider what would happen if the protocol
parameters in the Tezos PoS implementation were modified. This
is in the same vein as the “Choosing the Constants” portion of
the Emmy+ analysis [13], which considers the probability of self-
ish mining and deep reorgs separately and heuristically chooses
parameters based on a visual analysis of the figures.
We adopt the same protocol parameters, but expand on their
analysis, giving a well-defined objective and exploring a larger
domain of protocol parameter combinations. To choose better pro-
tocol parameters, we consider minimizing a weighted sum of the
probability of selfish mining and deep reorgs concurrently.
Although both deep reorgs and selfish mining result in deleting
blocks from the public chain, these two objectives have opposite
effects on the choice of protocol parameters. This surprising phe-
nomenon comes about because selfish behavior occurs on a much
shorter scale than the long reorgs that offer double-spend opportu-
nities.
To understand this, note that an endorsement included on a
low priority block is worth much less than one on the highest-
priority block (3). For this reason, each time an attacker builds a low
priority block using their private set of endorsements, each of the
endorsements loses considerable value. This causes the profitable
forks to occur overwhelmingly at shorter block lengths (e.g., an
attacker with α = 0.45 never finds a profitable selfish-mine of
length 20, while if they are looking just to do a reorg of that length,
they have a probability of 0.1 per block). As a result, an attacker
looking to execute a selfish-mine prefers an extremely high value of
Initial Endorsers (as described below), because if they have a
few blocks with many of the top priorities, they can slow the honest
network down by withholding relatively few endorsements. Now
consider instead an attacker trying to perform a long-range reorg.
With a high value of Initial Endorsers, the attacker will have
to pay a time penalty for each missing endorsement, and thus each
block will be slower, making long range forks nearly impossible.
This demonstrates why optimizing the protocol to resist only deep
reorgs or only selfish mining is unsuccessful. A safe protocol must
find a balance between these two attack vectors.
4.1 Protocol Parameters
In our analysis, we keep the structure of the Tezos PoS protocol
unchanged, but alter the following three protocol parameters, which
are the same as those modified by Nomadic Labs [13].
(1) Initial Endorsers (default=24): This is the minimum
number of endorsements needed to not be penalized for
missing endorsements. Denoted ei (ie in [13]).
(2) Delay Endorse (default=8): The time penalty, in sec-
onds, accrued for each missing endorsement below Initial
Endorsers. Denoted de (de in [13]).
(3) Delay Priority (default=40): The time penalty, in sec-
onds, accrued for each drop in priority below 0. Denoted dp
(dp in [13]).
The default values are from the Carthage version of the Tezos
PoS specification [14]. With these parameters, we use the same
general formulation of delay as Nomadic Labs [13]:
D(p, e) = 60 + dp · p + de · max(ei − e, 0). (13)
By varying the values of these parameters, we examine how the
frequency of deep reorgs and selfish-mines changes as the protocol
parameters are altered.
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Figure 4: The relative performance of the Tezos PoS protocol, ξ = (24, 8, 40), compared to a design with parameters ξ = (15, 5, 8),
for both α = 0.4 and α = 0.45. For example, a value of 0.4 means that the performance of the Tezos PoS design is 2.5 (2.5 = 1/0.4)
times larger than the minimum (optimal for α ) value. For both choices of α , the alternative design outperforms the Tezos PoS
design for all values of β . The left figure was calculated with n1 = 3 & n2 = 8 and the right figure with n1 = 3 & n2 = 20.
4.2 Balancing Malicious Reorgs and Selfish
Mining
We optimize the design for a given value of α (say α = 0.45 or
α = 0.4), because large stake attackers have the highest probability
of successfully launching reorg attacks. We also fix two lengths, n1
and n2, for the deep reorg and selfish-mine respectively.
In order to ensure the objective function weights the probabil-
ities relatively evenly, we choose a deep reorg length of 20 and a
selfish-mine of length 3 which, for α = 0.45, have approximately
the same probability of occurring. This ensures that the design
objective considers both kinds of attacks. We vary the choice of
objective weights between the probability of malicious reorgs and
the probability of selfish mining.
Let Fn (S) denote the feasibility function of a reorg of length-n.
Let Pn (S) denote a function describing if a reorg of length-n is
profitable and feasible in the given state (e.g., a selfish-mine state).
We represent the Tezos PoS design parameters by the tuple ξ =
(ei ,de ,dp ), and for a given attacker stake α , consider the objective
O(ξ , β) = (1 − β) Pr[Fn1 (S)|α , ξ ]︸             ︷︷             ︸
O1
+β Pr[Pn2 (S)|α , ξ ]︸              ︷︷              ︸
O2
, (14)
where parameter β ∈ [0, 1] controls the relative weight given to the
considerations of O1 and O2, corresponding to the probability of a
deep reorg of length n1 and a selfish-mine of length n2, respectively.
For the choices of n1 = 20 and n2 = 3, and with α = 0.45, the
probabilities of reorgs and selfish mining are 0.05974 and 0.07243,
respectively. We also demonstrate similar results with α = 0.4,n1 =
8, and n2 = 3 in Figure 4.
We consider the following choice of PoS design parameters:
◦ Initial Endorsers: ei ∈ [0, 32]
◦ Delay Endorse: de ∈ [4, 20]
◦ Delay Priority: dp ∈ [0, 60]
These are chosen to provide a large range around the current
Tezos implementation of ξ = (24, 8, 40).
4.3 PoS Protocol Design Results
Figure 3 demonstrates three slices of the resulting 3D array of
the objective function, for the choice of β = 0.5. Figures 3 and 5
include a Gaussian filter to reduce noise and display the underlying
structure more clearly. Each slice fixes the value of the current
Tezos implementation for one of the variables, and the blue square
in each highlights the current Tezos combination of ξ = (24, 8, 40).
Figure 3 illustrates the structure of O, for β = 0.5, as a function
of the design parameters. Low values (dark) are preferable. The
Tezos implementation has a relatively low value. However, there
are better choices for design parameters dp and de , and these also
have the added benefit of keeping the block creation rate fast, and
in some cases, even speeding it up.
Figure 4 compares the current Tezos parameterization with an
alternative PoS protocol that makes use of design parameters ξ =
(15, 5, 8), varying β on the x-axis and showing results for both
attacker stake α = 0.4 and α = 0.45. At each value of β , we plot
the ratio of the minimum value of the objective function to the
value of either the alternative or current protocol parameters. For
example, a value of 0.4 means that Tezos PoS achieves an objective
that is 2.5 times larger than the minimum value acheived by any ξ .
Sometimes, the reduction in probability is far greater. For example,
an α = 0.4 attacker can expect about 24 length-10 reorgs a day
using the current Tezos implementation, but only 1 per-day under
our modified protocol. Further, that same attacker could expect
about one length-20 reorg per day under the Tezos protocol, but
only one per year under the modified system.
Figure 5 illustrates the way in which different weightings change
the value of the objective function. Each cell represents a specific
value of design parameters ξ . In this case, we give results for a
choice of β = 0, 0.7, and 1. Figure 5 (top) only cares about malicious
reorgs, the objective in Figure 5 (middle) cares about both, and
Figure 5 (bottom) only cares about selfish mining. As the weighting
changes, the landscape essentially flips from high values on the
left to high values on the right. This demonstrates that minimizing
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Figure 5: The relative performance of the Tezos PoS protocol
for choices of β = 0, β = 0.7, and β = 1 (top, middle, bottom).
Each problem of optimal design fixes Delay priority = 40,
which is the choice made in the Tezos PoS protocol and the
blue boxes correspond to the Tezos design. The shape of the
landscape completely flips as a result of different consider-
ations of objective weight β .
for the two objectives can pull the protocol parameters in opposite
directions, confirming that need both to be considered for choosing
the rules of PoS.
The current Tezos implementation appears to perform far worse
than the alternative. However, we caveat this result with two im-
portant features of the objective function. First, the regions of low
values on the objective landscape are large. Figure 3 presents this
visually with relatively widespread dark regions that imply that
many possible parameter configurations will do well to keep the
objective low. Second, this only considers a single value of α .
To understand the effect of different stake amounts, Figure 4
shows an alternative value of ξ outperforming Tezos both at α = 0.4
and α = 0.45, but these are still high values of α . It is plausible
that the current Tezos implementation outperforms the alternative
when the attacker stake and thus the probabilities of attacks are far
lower.
5 DETECTING MALICIOUS REORGS IN
TEZOS POS
In this section, we introduce a method to detect malicious reorgs
that are in progress on the Tezos blockchain. The calculations that
we provide correspond to the current Tezos PoS protocol, but the
method can also be used for other design parameters. This metric al-
lows vulnerable states of the Tezos chain to be identified, and users
can know when to be careful with large transactions. It doesn’t
eliminate the concern about deep reorgs, mainly because it is dif-
ficult to get large adoption of the metric within the community.
Further, if no transactions are being accepted during a deep reorg,
an attacker can effectively execute a denial of service attack, which
is also highly undesirable.
We denote the state variables with overset bars to indicate that
the variable refers to slots in the past rather than the future (e.g.,
h¯ℓ−k denotes the priority with which a block at slot ℓ−k was baked
by the honest network). Let ω define the window of security, or the
number of blocks in the past that we will consider. Intuitively, this
corresponds to the maximum length attack that is accounted for,
and we only consider forks starting at slots (ℓ−ω + 1, ℓ−ω, ..., ℓ)
given the current public head is at slot ℓ. Denote the state of the
past ω blocks as S¯. This is different from the state as viewed by
the attacker, because S¯ is backward-looking in time rather than
forward-looking, and only a function of things that have already
been committed to the chain and thus are available publicly. Let
h¯ = (h¯ℓ−ω+1, h¯ℓ−ω , ..., h¯ℓ) denote the priorities with which the last
ω blocks were published, and e¯ = (e¯ℓ−ω , e¯ℓ−ω+1, ..., e¯ℓ−1) denote
the number of endorsements over the same sequence of blocks. The
current state at slot ℓ is denoted S¯ = {h¯, e¯}.
Figure 6 shows the forking possibilities (e.g., blocks at which the
attackers fork could have started) that the detection metric uses to
determine the health of the state, S¯. Let S¯j denote the jth slot in
the past. Let δ¯h (S¯,k) denote the minimum time needed to create
the past k blocks using the priority levels and endorsement counts
found on the past k blocks on the chain (e.g., the last k values of
the sequences h¯ and e¯), i.e.,
δ¯h (S¯,k) =
k−1∑
j=0
D(h¯ℓ−j , e¯ℓ−j−1). (15)
Let δ¯a (S¯,k) denote the minimum time it would take an attacker
to create the last k blocks while using the best remaining priority
and all the missing endorsements from the public chain (e.g., if
the public block at slot ℓ − k was baked with priority 0 and 22
endorsements, then the best block the attacker could create would
be with priority 1 and 10 endorsements).
The time it will take the attacker to create a block at slot j in the
past is,
δ¯a, j (S¯j ) =
{
D(0, 32 − e¯ℓ−j−1) if h¯ℓ−j , 0
D(1, 32 − e¯ℓ−j−1) otherwise.
(16)
The total time it would take the attacker to create the last k
blocks is,
δ¯a (S¯,k) =
{
D(0, 32) +∑k−1j=1 δ¯a, j (S¯j ) if h¯ℓ−k+1 , 0
D(1, 32) +∑k−1j=1 δ¯a, j (S¯j ) otherwise. (17)
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Figure 6: This figure helps explain the intuition behind our health metric for Tezos PoS. The gold block represents the current
public head of the chain, and the green blocks show the lastω public blocks. The red-dashed blocks represent potential blocks
that could be created by an attacker with the highest available priority and all the missing endorsements for the previous k
blocks. The priorities of the potential blocks are !(h¯j ), where ! maps all non-zero elements to 0 and all 0 elements to 1 (e.g.,
!(5) = 0, while !(0) = 1). The highest available priority at slot ℓ − j is 0 if the block on the honest chain was not baked with 0
priority, and 1 otherwise. δ¯h is the amount of time take for the honest network to create blocks in slots ℓ −k + 1 through ℓ, and
δ¯a is the same calculation for the potential blocks.
Figure 7: The value of the health metric, H(S¯), over the course of 968 simulated blocks. Each square of the grid represents a
block, and the order in time is from left to right, and from top to bottom. The block health is represented by the color, with
white being perfectly healthy and black being perfectly unhealthy. The simulation considers an attacker with α = 0.375 stake
and who considers attacks of length 8 or greater. The red squares indicate blocks at which the attacker carries out a reorg, and
are labelled with the block at which the reorg occurred and the number of blocks that are deleted. In each case, the health
metric immediately detects the malicious behavior, and signifies an unhealthy chain all the way through the attack.
The first block on the attacker’s chain will include all 32 endorse-
ments because the endorsements for the last common block will be
valid. The rest of the blocks on the attacker chain will only include
32 − e¯i endorsements for each slot i .
We are interested in the difference between these two times,
∆k (S¯) = δ¯a (S¯,k) − δ¯h (S¯,k). If ∆k (S¯) is small, an attacker could
have created k valid blocks close to the time it took the honest
network, and thus could overtake the public chain and perform
a reorg in the future. Now we consider the value of ∆k (S¯) that
corresponds to a perfectly healthy chain. Intuitively, under ideal
chain conditions (e.g., highest priority of each block and all 32
endorsements included), ∆k (S¯) grows linearly with regard to k ,
because each block created is a constant time faster than the next
fastest block, and ∆k (S¯) ∝ k . Dividing ∆k (S¯) by k gives a value
that corresponds to the health of the chain. This leads us to a health
metric for the Tezos blockchain which describes how probable a
reorg is in the future.
Definition 5.1 (Health metric). Given the priorities, h¯, and en-
dorsement counts, e¯, of the public chain over the last ω blocks, we
define the health of the chain,H , as
H(S¯) =
{
mink<ω
∆k
k if mink ∆k > 0
0 otherwise.
(18)
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This metric H(S¯) returns zero if the minimum value of ∆k is
less than zero. In this case, the attacker can already override the
honest chain, because the attacker can create k blocks faster than
the honest network. The minimum value of the metric is zero,
corresponding to the lowest possible chain health. We take the
minimum value of the ratio with respect tok because this represents
the block in the past from which there is the highest risk of a fork.
The relationship with the delay function (1) makes the health
metric highly sensitive to missing block priorities, which each
incur a 40 second time penalty. On the other hand, a few missing
endorsements has a minimal effect on the metric because this does
not slow down the honest network.
Through an analysis of 10,000 blocks, we find that 9,932 of them
were baked with priority 0, and thus several low priority blocks
being baked in a row is a strong signal of an attack and will be
immediately detected. Additionally, the endorsement counts are
distributed normally with a mean of 22.26 and a standard deviation
of 2.28. Under these conditions, the metric will report a low risk of
forks, because no potentially faster forks can be made with such
limited withholding of endorsement and priorities.
The health metric assumes that the attacker is not double baking
or endorsing, which refers to a single delegate creating or endorsing
multiple blocks of the same height. Double baking would only be
of use to the attacker if they were able to split the honest majority,
but based on our model, where both honest and attacker operations
are instantly heard over the network, this is impossible. Thus the
only way in which the attacker can slow down the honest chain
is to withhold endorsements and blocks with high priority. Thus,
participating in any way on the honest fork would only decrease
the time between blocks for the honest fork and would not speed
up the selfish fork, and thus would be of no use to the attacker.
5.1 Simulations
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the health metric,H(S¯),
we simulate the network with an attacker executing malicious
reorgs. The metric can also be used to detect selfish mining attacks
by looking for endorsement and priority withholding.
Figure 7 shows the health metric over the course of 968 simulated
blocks. Each cell represents a block on the honest chain, and they
are ordered from left to right and top to bottom (e.g., top left cell is
block 1, and bottom right cell is block 968). Low values of health
are indicated by the darker values of cells. In the simulation there
is an attacker controlling α = 0.375, and we assume the attacker
only considers reorgs of length 8 or greater, and gives preference
to longer range attacks (e.g., if both length 8 and length 10 reorgs
are possible, the attack of length 10 is chosen).
The red boxes indicate the blocks at which the attacker carries
out a reorg, and are labelled with the index of the block where the
deletion occurred, as well as the number of honest blocks that were
removed. From these results, we see that the health metric imme-
diately detects the malicious behavior and indicates an extremely
unhealthy chain all the way through the attack. Notice that as the
attacker begins to withhold blocks on a private chain, the colors of
the cells quickly transition from white to black, indicating that an
attack is becoming very likely.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented an analysis of the possibility of malicious re-
orgs on the Tezos protocol in which we have formulated statistical
techniques for determining the degree of the protocol’s vulnera-
bility to malicious reorgs and demonstrated that a different choice
of parameters can reduce the probability of attack. In considering
alternate configurations of the Tezos PoS protocol, we evaluated
an objective function with different weights assigned to the prob-
ability of selfish mining versus that of malicious reorgs. We also
provided a method for detecting malicious reorgs by defining a
health metric that makes use of publicly available information to
identify vulnerable chain states. This metric can be employed by
users of the Tezos blockchain, including merchants, to determine
how long to wait before confirming large transactions as valid.
There are many interesting future directions to this work. The
simplest may be to apply similar techniques to other protocols
(perhaps attempting to extend analysis to protocols that rely on
fork choice rules that do not use the longest-chain heuristic), to
evaluate their security and find network parameters that optimize
for transaction safety. One may also consider ensemble attacks that
combine malicious reorgs with attacks on the chain’s peer-to-peer
communication network, which may prove to be more effective
than reorgs in isolation. Further, we only consider alternative delay
functions with the same functional form as the current Tezos imple-
mentation. It would be interesting to examine how other kinds of
delay and reward functions, potentially of non-linear form, impact
the probability of reorgs.
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A DIRECT CALCULATION OF ATTACK
FEASIBILITY
Using the state variable distributions and our feasibility function,
we can directly calculate an approximation of the probability of a
length-n malicious reorgs by finding each permutation of the state
space variables that corresponds to a feasible attack, and adding all
of the probabilities of those occurring. Procedure 1 demonstrates
this approach.
However, there are two challenges. First, the domains ofA andH
are infinite, thus we cannot sum over every permutation of the state
variables, and we have to approximate this by truncating. We chose
a truncation point by using the criterion that we only consider
states where every slot of the state occurs with probability greater
than 10−8. This results in a very minimal underestimation of the
true probability (on the order of 10−6 in our experiments), which is
several orders of magnitude smaller than the actual probabilities as
shown in Table 1 in Appendix B.
Lemma A.1. If ai ≥ 153, then Pr[Si ] ≤ 10−8.
Proof. We use ai as the limiting bound because we always
assume that the attacker has less than 50% of the total stake in the
system. Thus the domain of A will be the largest. First note that
the probability of a slot Si is less than the probability of each state
variable in that slot, and namely,
Pr[Si ] ≤ Pr[ai ]. (19)
Thus we need to choose an upper bound, a′ for the domain of A
such that for all ai ≥ a′, Pr[ai ] ≤ 10−8. The smallest α we consider
is 0.1, so using the definition of the geometric random variable we
establish,
Pr[ai ] = (0.9)ai · 0.1. (20)
This gives the following inequality,
Pr[ai ] ≤ 10−8 =⇒ (0.9)ai · 0.1 ≤ 10−8, (21)
which we solve directly
ai ≥ ln 10
−7
ln 0.9 ≥ 152. (22)
□
Second, the state space grows exponentially in the number of
blocks in the attacking fork. For example, consider the case of a
length-2 reorg, where we use the following ranges for our state vari-
ables, A = [0, 1, 2, ..., 152],H = [0, 1, 2, ..., 152],E = [0, 1, 2, ..., 32].
Because we need three slots of state variables to compute the
probability of a have a length-2 reorg, the number of permutations
is 1533 · 1533 · 333 ≈ 4.6 × 1017. There are optimizations to reduce
the size of the state space, but in the best case it remains exponen-
tial. In order to come to reasonable conclusions about arbitrary
length reorgs, we use a Monte Carlo method (see Appendix C) as
well as importance sampling (see Appendix D) to approximate the
probability of malicious reorgs of length 2 and greater.
Procedure 1 Find attack probability
Require: α
1: totalProb← 0
2: for S ∈ (A × H × E)n do
3: a, h, e ← S
4: if XOR(a, h) and F (S) then
5: totalProb+= Pr[S]
6: end if
7: end for
8: return totalProb
This procedure checks every permutation of the possible values
of the state variables {a, h, e} by taking the Cartesian product of
the possible values for A,H ,E, n times. For each permutation, it
first checks if the length-n reorg is feasible, and if it is, adds the
probability of it occurring to the total probability. We use XOR as a
vector function that is applied element wise to two sequences and
that maps any non-zero value to true (e.g., XOR([1, 0, 3], [0, 4, 0]) =
true, while XOR([1, 0, 3], [1, 4, 0]) = false). Note that this isn’t an
exact probability because the domains of the geometric random
variables A and H are infinite.
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B ANALYTIC AND APPROX COMPARISON
α Analytic Approx. Error
0.10 0.000142 0.000141 ± 7.4 × 10−6 1.00 × 10−6
0.15 0.001419 0.001406 ± 2.3 × 10−5 1.29 × 10−5
0.20 0.007789 0.007758 ± 5.4 × 10−5 3.10 × 10−5
0.25 0.029502 0.029561 ± 1.1 × 10−4 5.90 × 10−5
0.30 0.081157 0.081210 ± 1.6 × 10−4 5.30 × 10−5
0.35 0.176913 0.176781 ± 2.3 × 10−4 1.32 × 10−4
0.40 0.323585 0.323729 ± 2.9 × 10−4 1.44 × 10−4
0.45 0.504535 0.504405 ± 3.1 × 10−4 1.30 × 10−4
Table 1: Comparing the results for feasibility of length 1 re-
org with the Monte Carlo method algorithm to the analytic
results calculated using the probability distributions for a
range of values of α . Each of the MC values was calculated
using a sample size of 107. The 99%Clopper-Pearson interval
is shown as the range of approximate values. We see small
error for each of the approximations. Note that the error in-
creases as the probability of the event increases because vari-
ance of a binomial random variable increases until α = 0.5.
C MONTE CARLO METHOD
Let S denote the joint distribution on the random state variables,
and ®S a sample from S, with
®S = [aℓ+1 ... aℓ+n hℓ+1 ... hℓ+n eℓ+1 ... eℓ+n ]T .
(23)
A Monte Carlo estimate of the probability of a feasible attack,
given N samples, is
pˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
F (®Si ), where ®Si ∼ S. (24)
This is just the number of states satisfying the feasibility property
divided by the sample size (recall that F returns 1 if an attack is
feasible and 0 otherwise). This is an unbiased estimator for the true
probability p.
Algorithms C.1 & C.2 demonstrate the efficient sample genera-
tion and general Monte Carlo algorithm used. Table 1 in Appendix
B shows the comparison of the Monte Carlo approximation to the
analytic values described previously and demonstrate that they
produce very similar results (i.e., the Monte Carlo approximation
has low error).
C.1 Efficient Sample Generation
The following algorithm is used to generate a valid sample for each
Monte Carlo trial.
Subroutine 2 Get sample ai ,hi , ei
Require: α
1: h ← randomSample(Geometric(1 − α))
2: if h = 0 then
3: a ← randomSample(Geometric(α)) + 1
4: else
5: a ← 0
6: end if
7: e ← randomSample(Binomial(32,α))
8: return (a,h, e)
One subtle feature of this is the assigning of a in Line 3. Because
h already has the value of 0 for this draw, we know that a cannot
be zero, so we add one to the result.
C.2 Standard Monte Carlo Method
Weuse a standardMonte Carlo algorithm to estimate the probability
of a feasible length-n reorg.
Algorithm 3 Estimate probability of feasible attack - Standard
Monte Carlo
Require: α , attackLength, sampleSize
1: feasibleCount← 0
2: for i = 0, 1, ..., sampleSize − 1 do
3: state← {}
4: for j = 0, 1, ..., attackLength − 1 do
5: a,h, e ← generateSample(α)
6: state.add(a,h, e)
7: end for
8: if F (state) then
9: feasibleCount++
10: end if
11: end for
12: return feasibleCount / sampleSize
D IMPORTANCE SAMPLING
Monte Carlo estimation has the undesirable property that in the
case of rare events,nmust be extremely large to obtain a tight bound
for the confidence intervals around the estimator for p. In particular,
we are interested in obtaining a probability estimate for attacks
with probability, p ≈ 10−8 of being feasible. To improve sample
efficiency we make use of Importance Sampling. This makes use of
a different probability mass function q( ®S), the proposal distribution,
which has a higher weight on states that have the feasibility prop-
erty. Then using samples from the new probability mass function,
®S1, ®S2, ..., ®Sn i .i .d .∼ q(S), an unbiased estimator for p is,
pˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
F (®Si )p( ®Si )
q( ®Si )
. (25)
We construct the following estimator for the variance of our
estimated mean:
σˆ 2 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
F (®Si )p( ®Si )
q( ®Si )
− pˆ
]2
. (26)
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Thus we can construct a 99% confidence interval for the true value
of p as, pˆ ± 2.58σˆ/√n. We now discuss the practical considerations
of implementing importance sampling in this setting, as well as the
q distributions we used.
D.1 Practical considerations of Importance
Sampling
Weneed to design a proposal distributionq( ®S) such that the variance
of our estimator is small. For this, we use a different value of α to
parameterize the state variable distributions. The distribution on
state variables at each block height are, A ∼ Geometric(α),H ∼
Geometric(1 − α),E ∼ Binomial(32,α).
For the proposal distribution we choose αq > α . By increasing
the value of α , we are ensured that the probability of a feasible
attack will rise, and thus importance sampling detects them at a
higher rate than classical Monte Carlo. However, it is important that
we do not increase α by too much because this makes the likelihood
ratio very small, and can lead to numerical precision errors. Because
we are using a standard double floating point representation with 64
bits and a 53 bit mantissa, we can expect around 16 decimal places of
accuracy. Thus, we keep the likelihood ratio above 10−16 to provide
stability. Choosing αq is a nontrivial process, and for this reason
we only used importance sampling when the variance of the Monte
Carlo estimator is very high. Through experimentation we found
that the heuristic αq = α + 0.05 was sufficient for attacks of length
20 and 35, and the heuristic αq = α + 0.03 for attacks of length 55
and 80. This requires a bit of balancing to ensure that attacks are
much more probable with the value of αq , but the likelihood ratio
(the ratio of probability for a state to occur in p over that same state
probability in q) isn’t too small. We found a suitable range of αq by
incrementing it by 0.01 until the likelihood ratio fell below 10−16,
and using a value approximately in the middle of that range.
D.2 Variance reduction using Importance
Sampling
Figure 8: Importance sampling confidence intervals and
Clopper-Pearson intervals for all the estimators with prob-
ability under 10−7. This demonstrates how effective impor-
tance sampling is at reducing the variance for our problem.
Each marker is labelled with the reorg length and the color
of the error bars denotes whether it is importance sampling
(IS) or Clopper-Pearson (CP).
